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HIS Article presents the significant Texas criminal cases involving
pretrial procedure issues decided during the Survey period. Topics
covered include bail, discovery, former jeopardy, grand jury, sever-
ance, speedy trial, and venue.
I. BAIL
The court of criminal appeals decided two cases involving constitutional
considerations in bail practices during the Survey period. In Lee v. State'
the court considered the burden of proof required under the Texas Constitu-
tion2 in order to deny bail. In Lee the only evidence presented to support
the motion to deny bond was the prosecutor's testimony that a search of
Lee's home resulted in seizure of heroin. 3  The court found the evidence
insufficient to meet even the substantial showing of the guilt of the accused
test,4 which falls far below the trial evidence standard of proof which is be-
yond a reasonable doubt.5 The evidence failed to show that the defendant
was present at the time of the search and failed to establish any other affirm-
ative link between the defendant and the heroin seized 6
The court of criminal appeals recently affirmed a decision by the San
Antonio court of appeals by holding that Texas' mandatory ninety-five per-
cent remittitur to bondsmen provision 7 is unconstitutional because it violates
* B.A., J.D., Baylor University. Judge, 194th Judicial District Court, Dallas County,
Texas.
1. 683 S.W.2d 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
2. TEX. CONST. art. I, provides in part that bail may be denied to an individual "accused
of a felony ... committed while on bail for a prior felony for which he has been indicted ...
after a hearing, and upon evidence substantially showing the guilt of the accused of the offense
... committed while on bail .... "
3. 683 S.W.2d at 9. The prosecutor stated:
There has been an additional charge filed, which the paperwork is being brought
over. Terry William Lee, while out on bond for said offense, was arrested yes-
terday. A search warrant was executed at Terry William Lee's residence being
at 404 East Huff, on a search warrant, at such time approximately one-half
ounce of heroin, for which purpose the search warrant was executed, was
confiscated.
Id.
4. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 1la, discussed supra note 2.
5. 683 S.W.2d at 9.
6. Id.
7. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 2372p-3, § 13(b) (Vernon Supp. 1986) provides:
After a forfeiture, if the defendant is incarcerated within two years of a judg-
ment nisi, the bondsman shall be entitled to a remittitur of at least 95 percent if
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the separation of powers provision 8 of the Texas Constitution.9 The case,
Williams v. State10 involved an individual, indicted for a felony and released
on bond, who failed to appear at a scheduled probation hearing. " The trial
court ordered the bond forfeited and later entered a judgment nisi. The
court then entered summary judgment against Williams and his bondsman.
When the judgment became final, the trial court no longer had plenary
power with respect to the judgment.' 2 Almost two months after the judg-
ment became final, the bondsman filed a motion seeking a remittitur of at
least ninety-five percent of the bond previously forfeited.' 3 The state as-
serted that the trial court had lost its power to grant a remittitur after the
judgment had become final. The state also asserted that the mandatory bond
remittitur statute 14 was unconstitutional. The trial court rejected the state's
contention that the statute was unconstitutional because it allowed a court to
grant remittitur after final judgment. The trial court did find the statute
unconstitutional, however, to the extent that it usurped the trial court's dis-
cretion to determine the amount of remittitur to be granted. The court then
granted the bondsman an eighty-five percent remittitur. '5
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.1 6 The court of
criminal appeals affirmed the trial court's decision as to the unconstitutional-
ity of the statute but vacated the judgment of the trial court that eighty-five
percent of the bond be remitted to the bondsman. ' 7 In affirming the decision
of the trial court and the court of appeals, the court of criminal appeals
commented on the dubious wisdom of the remittitur statute.' 8 If the bonds-
man returned a defendant quickly before a final judgment was entered on the
he presents a sworn affidavit stating that the defendant was returned to custody,
in part, as a result of money spent or information furnished by the bondsman.
The remittitur shall be credited against an unpaid judgment of forfeiture or if
the judgment has been paid, the treasurer shall refund at least 95 percent.
Id.
8. TEX. CONST. art. II, § I (Vernon 1984) (providing for the division of governmental
powers into three separate branches).
9. Williams v. State, No. 652-84 (Tex. Crim. App., Jan. 8, 1986) (per curiam) (not yet
reported).
10. Id.
11. Williams v. State, 670 S.W.2d 717, 719 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984), aftd, No.
652-84 (Tex. Crim. App., Jan. 8, 1986) (not yet reported). The facts presented in this discus-
sion are taken from the court of appeals decision, which provides more detail than does the
court of criminal appeals decision.
12. 670 S.W.2d at 719. After the court entered summary judgment, the bondsman moved
for a new trial. The motion was overruled by operation of law pursuant to TEX. R. Civ. P.
329b (c) (Vernon Supp. 1986) (motion for new trial not ruled on within seventy-five days of
judgment signing is overruled by operation of law). Thirty days later the judgment became
final. 670 S.W.2d at 719. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b (c) (Vernon Supp. 1986) (trial court has
plenary power to grant new trial or vacate, modify, correct, or reform judgment for 30 days
after motion for new trial is overruled).
13. The motion was filed pursuant to TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2 3 7 2 p-3 , § 13(b)
(Vernon Supp. 1986) (granting right to seek remittitur after final judgment entered).
14. Id.
15. 670 S.W.2d 719.
16. Id. at 727.
17. No. 652-84, slip op. at 13.
18. Id. at 7.
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forfeiture, the bondsman would be subject to the trial court's discretion as to
how much, if any, of the forfeited bond should be remitted.' 9 If the bonds-
man waited until after final judgment, however, he would receive a
mandatory ninety-five percent remittitur. 20 The lack of a necessary corre-
spondence between the resources expended by the bondsman and the size of
remittitur received by the bondsman is not, however, a constitutional ground
for invalidating the statute. 2' Rather, the court of criminal appeals held the
statute unconstitutional because it altered and undermined a trial court's
final judgment and thereby presented a usurpation by the legislature of a
judicial power. 22 The Texas Constitution clearly gives the power over
bonds, and thus bond forfeitures, to the district court. 23 The legislature may
not infringe upon this power. To permit otherwise would render judicial
power "a mockery, subject to the whim of the Legislature. The finality of
judgments would not exist and courts would be legislative forums."'24
As a result of the holding in Williams, a trial court will no longer be
required to remit at least ninety-five percent of the amount forfeited if the
defendant is incarcerated within two years of the judgment nisi. In fact, the
trial court will only be able to grant a remittur during the period of time
between the judicial declaration of forfeiture and the time the judgment be-
comes final. 25 Once the judgment becomes final, the trial court loses its ple-
nary power over the judgment and therefore its jurisdiction to grant a
remittitur. 26
II. DISCOVERY
In 1985 the Fort Worth court of appeals decided a case involving discov-
ery under the controversial child videotape statute.27 The statute allows the
substitution at trial of videotaped testimony of a child who is an alleged
victim of sexual misconduct for actual testimony.28 The case, Reynolds v.
19. Id.; see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 22.16 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986) (bond
remittitur subject to court's discretion prior to entry of judgment).
20. No. 652-84, slip op. at 7; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2372p-3, § 13(b)
(Vernon Supp. 1986).
21. See No. 652-84, slip op. at 8 and cases cited therein.
22. Id. at 10.
23. The Texas Constitution provides:
The judicial power of this State shall be vested in one Supreme Court, in one
Court of Criminal Appeals, in Courts of Appeals, in District Courts, in County
Courts, in Commissioners Court, in Courts of Justices of the Peace, and in such
other courts as may be provided by law.
TEX. CONST. art. V, § 1. Furthermore, "the District Court shall have original jurisdiction in
all criminal cases of the grade of felony; in all suits in behalf of the State to recover penalties,
forfeitures and escheats ...." Id. § 8.
24. No. 652-84, slip op. at 12.
25. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 22.02 (Vernon 1966) (manner of taking a
forfeiture); art. 22.12(a), 22.16 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986) (defining power of court to proceed
in forfeiture action and to remit before judgment).
26. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b.
27. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
28. The statute, TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071 (Vernon Supp. 1986), applies
to testimony of children under the age of 13. The testimony must be obtained pursuant to
criminal proceedings including, but not limited to, offenses under TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
1986]
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Dickens,29 involved a petition by Reynolds to the court of appeals for a writ
of mandamus ordering the trial court to vacate its denial of Reynolds's dis-
covery motions. Reynolds, in a pre-trial motion, had requested that he, his
attorney, and a psychologist employed as an expert witness be granted full
access to the videotape.30 The trial court denied Reynold's motion but ruled
that defense counsel would be permitted to view the videotape. Reynolds'
petitioned for a writ of mandamus on the ground that the trial court abused
its discretion by denying the discovery motion. The court of appeals agreed
with Reynolds and granted the writ. 31 The Fort Worth court of appeals
thus decided in Reynolds that a psychologist employed by an accused must
be given an opportunity to view a child videotape made in compliance with
the child videotape statute.32 The correctness of this holding is questionable
due to the extraordinary procedure employed by Reynolds to get relief. The
discovery issue in this case is actually overshadowed by the procedural issue.
Historically, the court of criminal appeals has held that a writ of mandamus
will not issue to compel a discretionary act. 33 The court of appeals in Reyn-
§§ 21.01-.1 1 (sexual offenses); § 43.25 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (sexual performance by a child).
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071 § 2(a) (Vernon Supp. 1986) provides:
The recording of an oral statement of the child made before the proceeding
begins is admissible into evidence if:
(1) no attorney for either party was present when the statement was made;
(2) the recording is both visual and aural and is recorded on film or video-
tape or by other electronic means;
(3) the recording equipment was capable of making an accurate recording,
the operator of the equipment was competent, and the recording is accurate and
has not been altered;
(4) the statement was not made in response to questioning calculated to lead
the child to make a particular statement;
(5) every voice on the recording is identified;
(6) the person conducting the interview of the child in the recording is pres-
ent at the proceeding and available to testify or be cross-examined by either
party;
(7) the defendant or the attorney for the defendant is afforded an opportu-
nity to view the recording before it is offered into evidence; and
(8) the child is available to testify.
29. 685 S.W.2d at 479 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no pet.).
30. Id. at 480. Reynold's requested:
1. That he be permitted, at his own expense, to make a copy of the videotape,
or;
2. That Relator's expert witness, a psychologist, be permitted to view the
videotape along with defense counsel, or;
3. That the expert witness be permitted to view the tape simultaneously with
the jury view and thereafter be excused from the witness rule [TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 36.03 (Vernon 1981)] so that he could testify.
Id.
The witness rule referred to in item number three of the above motion is TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 36.03 (Vernon 1981), which provides in part:
At the request of either party, the witnesses on both sides may be sworn and
placed in the custody of an officer and removed out of the courtroom to some
place where they cannot hear the testimony as delivered by any other witness in
the cause. This is termed placing witnesses under the rule.
Id.
31. 685 S.W.2d at 486.
32. 685 S.W.2d at 483-86.
33. See Texas Department of Corrections v. Dalehite, 623 S.W.2d 420, 424 (Tex. Crim.
[Vol. 40
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olds reached the discovery issue by finding that the trial court abused its
discretion. 34 Judge Clinton warned against just such utilization of civil stan-
dards in the area of writs of mandamus in criminal cases in his concurring
opinion in Millsap v. Lozano.35
The Fort Worth court of appeals found an abuse of discretion in order to
permit discovery. The real crux of the problem is not discovery, but cross-
examination and due process. The denial of the defense discovery request
and the invocation of the witness rule, together with the defense attorney's
interpretation 36 of the applicable law, worked to deny the accused any cross-
examination of his accuser. The child videotape provision 37 will continue to
spawn opinions such as Reynolds until the court of criminal appeals ad-
dresses the inherent constitutional dilemma created by the statute.
III. FORMER JEOPARDY
The court of criminal appeals addressed the issue of double jeopardy in
Franklin v. State.3 8 A jury convicted Franklin of capital murder but the
court of criminal appeals reversed the conviction because the prosecution
had improperly introduced into evidence Franklin's refusal to testify at a
pre-trial hearing.3 9 Upon retrial, a jury again convicted Franklin of capital
murder. Franklin successfully moved for a new trial on the ground of im-
proper instruction to the jury. Once again a jury convicted Franklin. The
instant case involved Franklin's appeal from the new trial on the ground that
the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Con-
stitution40 barred his retrial. 4 1
The court of criminal appeals rejected Franklin's claim on two grounds.
First, under article 40.08 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the effect
of a new trial is to place the cause in the same position as it was in before any
trial took place.42 Thus jeopardy does not attach.4 3 Second, double jeop-
App. 1981); Orduzey v. Bean, 579 S.W.2d 911, 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Bradley v. Miller,
458 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
34. 685 S.W.2d at 485-86.
35. 692 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (Clinton, J., concurring). "While it is axio-
matic that mandamus will not issue to compel a discretionary act as distinguished from a
ministerial act, but may issue to compel entry of a judgment, the writ must not specify the kind
or character of judgment." Id. at 485. Judge Clinton complains that the "[p]rotections af-
forded in the criminal law should not be abridged in the name of comity." Id.
36. Defense counsel commented "although the statute provides that we can call the child
as a witness, the Court is also aware that you cannot impeach your own witness once you call
them." 685 S.W.2d at 482. The child videotape statute does provide that "if the electronic
recording of the oral statement of a child is admitted into evidence under this section, either
party may call the child to testify, and the opposing party may cross-examine the child."
37. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071, § 2(b) (Vernon Supp. 1986). The prosecu-
tor is unlikely, however, to call the child and give the defense a chance to cross when a video-
tape is available.
38. 693 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc).
39. Franklin v. State, 606 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
40. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
41. 693 S.W.2d at 432.
42. Id.; see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 40.08 (Vernon 1979).
43. Id. Note that if the jury had convicted Franklin of the lesser included offense of
murder and a new trial had been granted, the verdict upon the first trial would constitute an
19861
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ardy does not attach when, as here, a case is reversed because of trial error,




The Fifth Circuit decided an interesting constitutional question during the
Survey period regarding the power of the grand jury to compel testimony
from a recalcitrant witness. In Port v. Heard45 the Fifth Circuit held that
the people's right to hear a witness' testimony about a murder outweighed
the witness' first amendment claim that his religion forbade him from giving
testimony against his son.46 David Port, the son of Bernard Port and step-
son of Odette Port, was suspected of murder of a Houston mail carrier. Ber-
nard and Odette refused to testify before the Harris county grand jury
asserting, among other grounds, that their sincere adherence to the tenants
of the Jewish religion prohibited them from testifying against David. The
Ports invoked not only the general exhortation to honor one's child but the
Talmudic proscription that forbids a parent from testifying against his child
in a secular court.
The court applied a balancing test to the Port's first amendment claim and
held that the state's compelling interest in investigating crime outweighed
the parents' constitutional right to have their religious convictions protected
by the court.4 7 The court relied on the United States Supreme Court deci-
sion in Branzburg v. Hayes4s which held that the public interest in securing
complete grand jury investigation of crimes outweighed the free speech
claims of journalists who wished to conceal the identities of their
informants.49
The Texas Court of Criminal appeals addressed the issue of minority rep-
resentation on grand juries in Session v. State.5 0 In his appeal from a capital
murder conviction, Session contended that the trial court had committed
reversible error by refusing to allow the admission of historical statistical
evidence regarding grand jury composition. The court of criminal appeals
agreed with the defendant that statistical evidence of liast under-representa-
tion of blacks was relevant to a showing of intentional discrimination in the
selection of the grand jury that indicted him.5' The effect of a showing of
statistical under-representation is to shift the burden to the state to demon-
acquittal of the higher offense of capital murder. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.14
(Vernon 1981). See Ohio v. Johnson, 104 S. Ct. 2536, 2541-42, 81 L. Ed. 2d 425, 434-35
(1984); Whitehead v. State, 286 S.W.2d 947, 948 (Tex. Crim. App. 1956).
44. 693 S.W.2d at 432 (citing Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15 (1978); Ex parte
Duran, 581 S.W.2d 683, 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979)).
45. 764 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1985).
46. Id. at 432.
47. Id. at 432-33.
48. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
49. Id. at 690, 705-06.
50. 676 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1876, 85 L.
Ed. 2d 169 (1985).
51. Id. at 367.
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strate the absence of intentional exclusion of a minority. 52 Although the
court agreed with Session that the evidence should have been admitted at
trial, the court refused to reverse the conviction because the state had met its
burden of rebutting any inference of intentional misrepresentation. 53 The
state met this burden by calling to testify the commissioners who chose the
grand jury in question, as well as commissioners who had recently chosen
grand juries. 54 Each of the commissioners indicated that they based their
selections on the quality and character of potential jurors.
The commissioners also testified that they had in the past chosen grand
juries with as many as four blacks thirty-three percent of the total number
selected in a county in which the black population was approximately
twenty-five percent. Of the four commissioners responsible for having cho-
sen the grand jury at issue in Session, one was black; other black commis-
sioners were also called to testify as to the criteria that they used in selecting
grand jurors. Each commissioner testified that he or she had been instructed
by the court not to allow sex, national origin, race, religion, or color to affect
the selection process and to try to assemble a representative cross section of
the people living in the country. The court of criminal appeals found the
testimony of the commissioners that they followed the instructions, com-
bined with their testimony on the factors considered in the selection process,
sufficient to rebut the inference of discrimination arising from past statistical
under-representation of blacks on the grand jury.55
The Tyler court of appeals considered an allegation of improper influence
on grand jurors in Whittington v. State.56 The defendant in Whittington
pleaded guilty to delivery of controlled substances. He then appealed, alleg-
ing among other grounds of error that the sheriff had unduly biased grand
jurors prior to the time that the grand jury considered the charges against
him. The sheriff had met with the grand jurors on an informal basis57 and
urged them to help "clean up the dope problem." 5 8 The sheriff did not men-
tion Whittington by name to the grand jurors nor did he discuss the details
of Whittington's alleged offense in front of them. The court refused to find
that the sheriffs general comments were sufficient to warrant a finding that
the indictment was a result of grand juror bias.59
52. Id. (citing Castenada v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977)).
53. 676 S.W.2d at 367-68.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 368.
56. 680 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984, pet. ref d).
57. Id. at 510. The meeting occurred after the grand jurors had been discharged by the
trial judge and prior to the time the grand jurors were ordered to reassemble to consider addi-
tional cases. "Hence the meeting was nothing more than a free assembly of private citizens
wholly without any official power or authority to investigate or accuse any person or persons
suspected of committing criminal offenses." Id. at 511.
58. Id. at 510.




United States v. Davis60 involved a defendant who was tried and convicted
on several counts of obstruction of justice and fraud. On appeal, Davis as-
serted that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever the obstruc-
tion of justice counts from the fraud counts. Davis contended that this
denial constituted reversible error because his defense counsel would have
testified as a material witness to the obstruction counts had those counts
been severed. The defendant argued that the trial court's exclusion of his
defense counsel's testimony by refusing to sever the courts violated Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 14.61 The Fifth Circuit disagreed. 62 Rule 14
leaves the question of severance or other relief to the discretion of the trial
court. 63 Abuse of discretion is the standard of review for a district court's
denial of a rule 14 severance motion. 64 The Fifth Circuit refused to find that
the district court had abused its discretion. The court held that Davis had
failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the missing testimony was
essential and that the absence of such testimony resulted in substantial
prejudice. 65
VI. SPEEDY TRIAL
A. Constitutionality of the Speedy Trial Act
The continuing debate as to the constitutionality of Texas' Speedy Trial
Act 66 appears to be no closer to resolution this year than at the time of last
year's Survey. 67 The issue under debate is whether the caption of the Act is
sufficiently clear and precise to satisfy Texas' constitutional requirement that
titles provide fair notice of an act's contents. 68 The court of criminal appeals
has not addressed the issue since the 1984 case of Noel v. State.69 In Noel the
court refused to rule on the caption issue because the State failed to raise it
60. 752 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1985).
61. FED. R. CRIM. P. 14 provides: "If it appears that a defendant ... is prejudiced by a
joinder of offenses.., in an indictment or information or by such joinder for trial together, the
court may order an election or separate trials of counts . . . or provide whatever other relief
justice requires." Id.
62. 752 F.2d 963, 972-73 (5th Cir. 1985).
63. See FED. R. Civ. P. 14.
64. 752 F.2d at 974; see United States v. Forrest, 623 F.2d 1107, 1115 (5th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Cuesta, 597 F.2d 903, 919 (5th Cir. 1979).
65. 752 F.2d at 972-73; see United States v. Forrest, 623 F.2d 1107, 1115 (5th Cir. 1980);
Alvarez v. Wainwright, 607 F.2d 683, 686 (5th Cir. 1979) (movant must articulate and prove
prejudice); Baker v. United States, 401 F.2d 958, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
965 (1970) (movant must show nature of testimony that would be given if severance is
granted).
66. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. §§ 32A.01-.02 (Vernon Parn. Supp. 1986).
67. See Kinkeade, Criminal Procedure.- Pretrial, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 39 Sw. L.J.
483, 485-86 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Kinkeade, 1985 Annual Survey].
68. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 35 (Vernon 1984) provides that "if any subject shall be em-
braced in an act, which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void ... as to so
much thereof, as shall not be so expressed." See Ex parte Crisp, 661 S.W.2d 944, 948 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1983) (holding an act unconstitutional for failing to provide notice in its title).
69. No. 827-83 (Tex. Crim. App., March 14, 1984, reh'g granted) (not yet reported).
[Vol. 40
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at the trial court level and failed to assign the issue as error on appeal. 70 The
basis of the court's opinion was that the Texas constitution does not give the
state a right to due process and as such no fundamental error can exist for
the benefit of the state. 7' The court did, however, grant the state's motion
for rehearing and has not yet entered an opinion.
Three lower appellate courts have recently addressed the caption issue. In
Beddoe v. State72 a burglary defendant appealed his conviction on the
ground that his trial occurred in violation of the Speedy Trial Act. 73 The
state contended that Beddoe's trial did not constitute a denial of a right be-
cause the Speedy Trial Act is unconstitutional for failure of its caption to
provide fair notice. The Houston fourteenth district court of appeals dis-
agreed with the state's argument and held that the caption was sufficiently
clear to put readers on notice of the purposes of the Act. 74 During 1985 the
Houston first district court of appeals 75 and the Fort Worth court of ap-
peals 76 reached the same conclusion as the Beddoe court with respect to the
constitutionality of the Act.
B. The Effect of the Accused's Presence on Computation of Time
The Speedy Trial Act requires that the state must be prepared to try a
felony case within 120 days of the date on which a criminal action is com-
menced against the accused. 77 This requirement has generated controversy
over the date that triggers the Act 78 and over what circumstances constitute
reasonable delays excludable from the 120 day computation. 79 During the
Survey period the court of criminal appeals twice addressed the issue of
whether the state's failure to have the accused present 80 was excusable delay
and therefore excludable from the 120 day time limitation.
70. Id., slip op. at 2.
71. Id.; See Kinkeade, 1985 Annual Survey, supra note 67, at 486.
72. 681 S.W.2d 14 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, pet. granted).
73. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 32A.02, § 1(t) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986). The
state was not ready for trial within the 120 days specified in the Act. 681 S.W.2d at 115.
74. 681 S.W.2d at 116. The court also held that the state had not diligently pursued the
defendant and had thus violated the Speedy Trial Act. The defendant's conviction was re-
versed for failure of the state timely to prosecute the case. Id.
75. See Morgan v. State, 696 S.W.2d 465, 467 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no
pet.). The defendant appealed from the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss for lack of
,speedy trial. As in Beddoe, the state argued that the Speedy Trial Act was unconstitutional
because its caption failed to give fair notice of the Act's contents. The court upheld the consti-
tutionality of the Act and reversed Morgan's conviction. Id. at 467.
76. See Wright v. State, 696 S.W.2d 288, 296 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth, 1985, no pet.).
The arguments and holding in this case are virtually identical to those in Beddoe and Morgan.
77. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 32A.02, § 1(1) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986).
78. Id. § 2; see infra notes 91-99 and accompanying text; Kinkeade, 1985 Annual Survey,
supra note 72, at 483-85.
79. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 32A.02, § 4 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986); see
Kindeade, 1985 Annual Survey, supra note 72, at 483-85.
80. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 32A.02, § 4 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986) provides
in part:
In computing the time by which the state must be ready for trial, the follow-
ing periods shall be excluded:
(1) a reasonable period of delay resulting from other proceedings involving
the defendant, including but not limited to proceedings for the determination of
19861
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The court of criminal appeals held in Ex parte Powell8' that placing a
detainer on a federal prisoner pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on De-
tainers Act,82 coupled with the state's continuous attempts to secure the de-
fendant's presence through numerous telephone conversations, constituted
due diligence.83 Since the state was diligent in attempting to obtain the de-
fendant, the time that the defendant spent in the federal institution was ex-
cludable for the purpose of computing when the state must be ready for
trial. 84 In Exparte Hilliard,85 however, the court held that the state's failure
to attempt to secure the presence of a defendant from the Texas Department
of Corrections, where he went voluntarily to attend a hearing on an alleged
parole violation, was not excludable as a reasonable delay for other proceed-
ings under the Speedy Trial Act. 86
C. Commencement of an Action Against an Accused for Purposes of the
Speedy Trial Act
The Speedy Trial Act deadline by which the state must be prepared for
trial begins to run once a criminal action is commenced against the ac-
cused. 87 The Dallas court of appeals held in Ellcey v. State88 that a criminal
action does not necessarily commence upon arrest. 89 Ellcey's arrest and brief
detention did not trigger the Speedy Trial Act because his initial arrest was
for a different offense than the one for which he was later indicted. 90
The Dallas court also decided Dean v. State91 during the Survey period.
The court held that the time between a no-bill after a defendant's arrest and
a true-bill of indictment later for the same offense falls within the exceptional
circumstance exclusion from the computation of time under the Speedy Trial
competence to stand trial, hearing on pretrial motions, appeals, and trials of
other charges;
(4) a period of delay resulting from the absence of the defendant because his
location is unknown and;
(A) he is attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution; or
(B) the state has been unable to determine his location by due diligence;
(5) a period of delay. resulting from the unavailability of the defendant
whose location is known to the state but whose presence cannot be obtained by
due diligence or because he resists being returned to the state for trial;
(10) any other reasonable period of delay that is justified by exceptional
circumstances.
Id.
81. 699 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
82. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 51.14 (Vernon 1979).
83. 699 S.W.2d at 842-43.
84. Id.
85. 687 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc).
86. Id. at 320; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 32A.02 § 4(1) (Vernon Pam. Supp.
1986) (granting reasonable delay exclusion for certain other proceedings).
87. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 32A.02, § 2(a) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986).
88. 694 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no pet.).
89. Id. at 202.
90. Id.
91. 697 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no pet.).
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Act.92 The time commenced for purposes of the Speedy Trial Act when the
defendant was arrested; the time was suspended when the grand jury re-
turned a no-bill and the court released the defendant without bond.9 3 When
the grand jury returned a true-bill several months later, the time began to
run again. 94 The intervening time between the no-bill and the true-bill tolled
the running of the Speedy Trial Act.95
D. The Obligation of the Judiciary Under the Speedy Trial Act
The Speedy Trial Act places a responsibility on the judiciary as well as on
the prosecutor to ensure an expeditious trial for the accused.9 6 The court of
criminal appeals recently reversed and dismissed Hull v. State due to a
nineteen month trial delay. 97 The delay resulted from the trial judge's arbi-
trary refusal to set the case for trial despite the accused's repeated attempts
to have his case docketed. In reaching its conclusion that the delay was
grounds for dismissal, the court of criminal appeals used the balancing ap-
proach formulated by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v.
Wingo.98 In Barker the Court identified four factors that should be weighed
by courts in balancing the defendant's right to a speedy trial against the
state's interest in prosecuting the case.99 Courts should consider how long
the trial was delayed, why it was delayed, whether the defendant actively
sought commencement of the trial, and the extent to which the delay
prejudiced the defendant. 100 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that
the lengthy and unjustified delay prejudiced Hull to such an extent that the
delay constituted a denial of his right to a speedy trial. 10 1
VII. VENUE
During the Survey period the court of criminal appeals considered two
cases involving the sufficiency of evidence to prove venue. Neither of the
decisions, however, altered the preponderance of the evidence standard of
proof necessary to prove venue in criminal cases. 10 2 In Moore v. State 10 3 the
court of criminal appeals rejected the defendant's challenge to the state's
92. Id. at 685; see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 32A.02, § 4(10) which allows ex-
clusion of time when the period of delay is reasonable and justified by exceptional circum-
stances. See supra note 80 for the full text of the exclusion.
93. 697 S.W.2d at 684.
94. Id. at 684-85.
95. Id.
96. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 32A.02 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986).
97. 699 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
98. 407 U.S. 514, 530-34 (1972).
99. Id. at 530.
100. Id.
101. 699 S.W.2d at 224.
102. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 13.17 (Vernon 1977) (to sustain allegation of
venue, party need only prove by preponderance that facts in case support venue in county of
prosecution); Black v. State, 645 S.W.2d 789, 790 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (en banc) (state
must prove venue when defendant places it in question by pleading not guilty).
103. 694 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
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proof of venue. 104 The court held that testimony by two of the three eyewit-
nesses as to where the offense occurred was more than sufficient to prove
venue.10 5 In Holdridge v. State10 6 the only evidence in the record as to
venue was testimony that the defendant committed the offense outside the
county in which the case was tried. 107 The court of criminal appeals inter-
preted article 44.24(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 10 8 to require that
the sufficiency of venue proof be challenged in the trial court. 10 9 Since the
defendant failed to object to or disprove venue at trial, the venue was pre-
sumed to be sufficiently proven. 110
In Ware v. State"' the Eastland court of appeals had an opportunity to
decide a novel venue question.112 The trial court convicted the defendant of
retaliation based on a cross-county telephone call.1 13 The defendant made
the phone call from a telephone located in Tarrant County to his girlfriend
in Nolan County. The court decided that the offense was committed par-
tially in each county and thus venue was proper in either county.' 14
The court of criminal appeals decided three cases of interest concerning
change of venue during the Survey period. Phillips v. State 115 raised the
issue whether a large quantity of publicity surrounding a trial would consti-
tute sufficient grounds for requiring a change of venue. To support his venue
motion, the defendant introduced several dozen articles from local newspa-
pers concerning the case. Several witnesses also testified that they did not
believe that the defendant could receive a fair trial in Harris County. The
state presented several witnesses who had reached the opposite conclusion
concerning the defendant's chances for receiving a fair trial. The court of
criminal appeals examined the newspaper articles and found them insuffi-
cient to support a change of venue. 116 In order to provide grounds for re-
quiring a change of venue, publicity concerning a case must be inflammatory
and prejudicial; fair and accurate articles designed to inform the public will
not support a change of venue.' '7
104. Id. at 530.
105. Id.
106. No. 0181-85 (Tex. Crim. App., Jan. 8, 1986) (not yet reported).
107. Id. at 768.
108. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.24(a) (Vernon Supp. 1986) provides for a pre-
sumption that venue was proven unless it was made an issue at the trial court level or unless
the impropriety of venue is otherwise demonstrated in the record.
109. No. 0181-85, slip op. at 5; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 13.04 (Vernon Supp.
1986) (if an offense is committed within 400 yards of a county's boundary, the offense may be
prosecuted in that county).
110. No. 0181-85, slip. op. at 9.
111. 697 S.W.2d 72, 73 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1985, no pet.).
112. Finding no Texas cases directly on point, the court relied in part on the Fifth Circuit
case of United States v. Strickland, 493 F.2d 187, 187 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. dismissed, 419 U.S.
801 (1974).
113. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 36.06 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
114. 697 S.W.2d at 73.
115. 701 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
116. Id. at 880.
117. Id.; see Bell v. State, 582 S.W.2d 800, 810-11 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (en banc); TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 31.03(a)(1) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1986); see also Whittington v.
State, 680 S.W.2d 505, 508-09 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984, pet. refd) (trial court did not abuse its
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In Bird v. State18 the court of criminal appeals considered the circum-
stances under which a defendant is deemed to have waived his right to the
automatic granting of a change of venue motion that is unopposed by the
state. The court had previously interpreted the state's venue statute'1 9 to
mean that courts must, as a matter of law, grant a proper motion for change
of venue unless the state files an affidavit in opposition, the defendant waives
the requirement of such an affidavit, or the court holds a hearing on the
motion. °20 The court found that the trial court had not deprived Bird of his
right to a change of venue. 12 1 Bird's motion for the change was incomplete
and thus provided no basis on which the state could file a controverting
affidavit.122 In addition, Bird's defense counsel waived his objection to the
lack of affidavits when he stated: "I don't have any objection to the court
considering the Motion for Change of Venue as though a controverting affi-
davit has been filed by the District Attorney's Office."'123 The court deemed
this sufficient for the defendant to waive his per se right to a change of venue
when no controverting affidavit is filed.' 24
The defendant in Franklin v. State2 5 was convicted in Harris County of
capital murder. The trial court granted a new trial and transferred the case
to Bexar County. The defendant moved for change of venue and the trial
was transferred from Bexar to Cameron County. On appeal, the defendant
contended that venue in Cameron County was improper because the trial
court failed to follow the requirements of article 31.01 of the Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure 2 6 when the case was originally transferred from Harris to
Bexar County. 127 The court of criminal appeals held that the defendant
waived any error in the transfer by failing to object at the time.' 28 The de-
fendant also waived any objection to the original transfer by consenting to
the transfer from Bexar to Cameron County. 129 Venue was thus properly
laid in Cameron County.130
discretion by refusing to grant defendant's motion for change of venue when bulk of the pub-
licity was informative rather than inflammatory and occurred several months before the trial).
118. 692 S.W.2d 65 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc).
119. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 31.04 (Vernon 1966).
120. 692 S.W.2d at 68 (citing McManus v. State, 591 S.W.2d 505, 516 (Tex. Crim. App.
1979)).




125. 693 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc).
126. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 31.01 (Vernon 1966).
127. 693 S.W.2d at 431.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 432; see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 13.20 (Vernon 1977) (providing
that venue may be acquired by consent).
130. 693 S.W.2d at 432; see Ex parte Watson, 601 S.W.2d 350, 352-53 (Tex. Crim. App.
1980) (trial court can have jurisdiction over the defendant even though venue is improper).
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